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Updating Copyright: Capitalizing on Digital
Opportunities
Jordan Call1

“D

igital theft is killing the music business,” proclaims
MusicUnited.org in an online petition. “It is destroying
jobs, opportunities and careers. Songwriters, artists,
musicians and vocalists, retailers, distributors, labels and publishers
are all at risk, as is the unique culture of American music itself.”2
These are strong words, but after all, “digital theft” has become
somewhat of an epidemic—the New York Times reports that as of
2010, 95 percent of downloaded music worldwide is pirated.3 It is
hard not to sympathize with the plight of the artist or publisher. They
are working hard to provide the public with culture and entertainment, but it seems that they have caught a terminal disease and are
hemorrhaging at an alarming rate. That disease has been a direct
result of the internet.
The internet allows for an unprecedented dissemination of information, as well as incredible means of connecting people worldwide.
One would think that this would make the internet one of the best
1
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things that ever happened to an industry whose aim is essentially
the creation and circulation of art and entertainment (or even more
abstractly, ideas and their expression). While no one would deny that
the internet has afforded many opportunities to artists and publishers, there seems to be a feeling that things were better before the
pernicious internet became as “the Boston strangler is to the woman
home alone.”4
The internet has had an inestimable impact on how easily and
frequently people engage in piracy. In most cases, there is little
ambiguity regarding the illegality of the downloading, uploading,
ripping, burning, and sharing that the modern consumer engages
in; however, I submit that the laws preventing piracy and sharing
are the actual source of societal detriment, rather than piracy and
sharing themselves. These laws inhibit a potentially more efficient
copyright system, and society could benefit by their revision. In this
article, I will argue that the digital revolution, in its virtual freedom
from scarcity, is being stunted by the stigma of current copyright
regulations. I will demonstrate that revising the law to allow private
reproduction and distribution in the case of digital media would do
more good than harm to creative output, as well as advance the aims
of copyright outlined in the Constitution. I will further demonstrate
that in the absence of the vending of digital files, other economic
factors will provide sufficient incentive to further the art and entertainment industries, while benefiting society through greater access
and use.

I. Legal Considerations
To understand why current copyright law is stunting rather than
encouraging progress from a digital perspective requires an under4

Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R.
4794 H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti,
MPAA) (Jack Valenti’s famous analogy of what the VCR—with relatively
tame copyright infringement capabilities compared to the world wide
web—was to the “American film producer and the American public”).
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standing of the state of copyright law and where it comes from, as
well as an understanding of the nature of digital media and how it
interacts with the law.
First, the law itself. Discussion of copyright is often focused on
how to balance the rights of users with the rights of creators to find
an optimal outcome.5 Unfortunately, it is usually the case that the
expansion of one of these party’s rights results in a reduction of the
other’s. If an artist were given complete power to restrict use, he or
she would be able to exclusively capture the benefits of his or her
work, thereby increasing the cost of access and limiting public use.
Conversely, if every creative work were public domain, it would be
difficult for the producer of the work to capitalize on his or her creation, despite widespread use. This issue may be framed in terms
of “thick” or “thin” copyright.6 The former seeks to “maximize
profits” for copyright holders.7 The latter, a “minimalist approach
to copyright,” attempts to maximize accessibility and public rights
by providing copyright holders with as little protection as possible
while still giving them incentive to create. Finding the appropriate
point along the continuum is difficult and is central to the purpose of
this paper. The search for this point must begin with certain groundfloor assumptions that depend on one’s interpretation of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”8
5

Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Law, 139-143 (2d ed. 2006).

6

Karen Coyle, Talk at the Library of Congress: The Technology of Rights:
Digital Rights Management (Nov. 19, 2003), available at http://www.
kcoyle.net/drm_basics1.html. (This dichotomy could also be set up as
the tension between “fair use” and “creator rights,” or the interests of the
“public” versus “private,” spheres, etc. For consistency’s sake, this article
will primarily describe the different parties as “consumers” and “producers/creators,” the former referring to anyone and everyone who would
benefit from the goods that the “producer/creator” either creates, supplies,
or publishes).

7
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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The “thick” and “thin” debate encapsulates the different approaches taken towards this passage. One political commentator
captures the thinking behind the “thick” approach:
The Constitution says that the purpose of patents and copyright is to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”
but the fact that the Constitution says this doesn’t mean it’s
the only reason to grant patents and copyrights . . . creators
have a moral right to profit from their works.9
Those who take this view argue that copyright is a moral right for
creators. But, however valid this idea may seem, this argument puts
words in the mouths of the framers of the Constitution. Talk of morality is conspicuously absent in the Copyright Clause.
The other interpretation maintains that copyright’s purpose
is progress, rather than protecting a “Lockean” idea of property
rights.10 This debate is admittedly ideological and largely subjective,
but this assertion more closely follows the wording of the Constitution and is thus a more compelling argument. Oberholzer-Gee and
Strumpf, professors of business at Harvard and Kansas University
respectively, hold that “weaker copyright is unambiguously desirable if it does not lessen the incentives of artists and entertainment
companies to produce new works.”11 Jessica Litman maintains that
the use of copyrighted works is what ultimately matters.12 The Constitution’s stated reason for copyright—the progress of art and

9

Kevin Drum, Authors Have a Moral Right to Profit from Their Works,
Mother Jones Blog (Feb. 15, 2012, 3:34 PM), http://www.motherjones.
com.

10

Gonna Do It Anyway, Even if It Doesn’t Pay, The Economist Blog (Feb.
16, 2012, 6:37 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/02/copyright.

11

Felix Oberholzer Gee, File Sharing and Copyright, Innovation
Policy and the Econ. (2010), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/605852.

12

Jessica D. Litman, Lawful Personal Use (Univ. of Mich. Program in Law
and Econ. Archive: 2003-2009, Working Paper No. 62, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps-olin/art62/.
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science13—centers upon the benefit to society that such rights will
provide. Thus, copyright becomes nothing more than a means to an
end rather than an end in itself (the end being progress). This assertion will be foundational in this pursuit of the correct balance
between creator rights and public rights.
Furthermore, if there is anything to be gained by changing copyright law, then the new policy must be in harmony with the Constitution. It is helpful to first identify the essential components of the
Copyright Clause: “to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (emphasis added).14 The first and most vital element of this clause is that any
policy that can claim to be Constitutional must necessarily “promote
progress”—a deceptively simple phrase. The second essential element, the part about the “exclusive right” to a work, also requires
interpretation. As a starting point, I offer a basic interpretation of
this clause: copyright law must (1) encourage capable people to produce “useful” works by (2) granting and protecting rights as copyright holders that will (3) bring them reimbursement proportional
to the perceived value that they create. Put more simply, copyright
laws must give producers incentive to produce. Copyright law cannot merely be evaluated in terms of the effect that it will have on one
party or another, but must necessarily assess the net effect on both
the creators and the users, as well as American society at large. If
the purpose of law is to benefit society, then a new legal balance of
rights that increase or maximize the net benefit to society ought to
be adopted as law.
The current legislative attitude towards copyright is best observed in the Copyright Act of 1976. This Act is the piece of legislation that has most directly governed copyright law for the last several
decades. A marked improvement upon its predecessor, the Copyright
13

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.

14

Id. Much of the history of copyright law has dealt with the duration of
copyright. See, e.g., Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 108
(2006); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Copyright Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006). The matter of duration is somewhat tangential to the current topic and thus will not be treated here.
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Act of 1909,15 the 1976 Act clarified and codified the rights of copyright holders. It also protected certain public rights by including
provisions for “fair use.” This Act established the general flavor of
copyright law to this day, and subsequent legislation,16 amendments,
and court decisions17 have generally fallen in line with this Constitutional interpretation.
At the heart of the Copyright Act lies its enumeration of the six
exclusive rights granted to a copyright holder, which are:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;
(4) . . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) . . . to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.18
These rights are granted for a period of life plus 70 years (subject to renewal),19 and any violation of these rights during the term
of copyright is termed “infringement.”20 Authors’ rights are limited
most significantly in two ways: first, by the aforementioned “fair
15

Gorman, supra note 4, at 2 (“The Copyright Act that dominated the twentieth century was enacted in 1909. Inartfully drafted and lacking important
definitions—and enacted before the invention or widespread commercial
use of the phonograph, motion pictures, radio and television . . . was
subject to frequent ad hoc amendment and to unguided judicial interpretation.”)

16

See, e.g., Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2006);
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 512 (2006). Technology,
Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, 17 U.S.C. § 110
(2002).

17

See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S.; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005).

18

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006).

19

Id.

20

17 U.S.C. § 501 (2011).
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use” exceptions, which grant the public rights in various contexts,
such as scholarship, parody, review, criticism, etc., especially when
that which is utilized is incidental or minimal.21 More importantly,
only the “expression” of ideas is protected, and not the ideas themselves.22 The first reason for this is that ideas are nearly impossible to
protect. The second reason is that impeding the flow of ideas would
be detrimental. The nature of ideas, discoveries, and art is such that
it moves forward incrementally; each creator owes a debt to those
creators who preceded him or her.23 If ideas became property, it
might threaten the creative progress, which would defeat entirely the
purpose mentioned in the Copyright Clause.

II. The Possibilities and Legal “Challenges” of Digital
Technology
Now to examine the nature of digital media, in order to see if
a more efficient balance could be struck between creator rights and
public rights. The internet age has brought significant changes to
innumerable facets of human life, and copyright considerations are
no exception. These changes have brought with them great opportunities relating to creativity, art, and scholarship. However, because
of current copyright law, many of these opportunities appear to be
challenges, since a large portion of their applications are against the
law as it stands today. If the law were revised to better fit the nature
of digital media, society could legally benefit from the vast opportunities afforded. Specifically, the Copyright Act should be revised
by eliminating the exclusive reproduction and distribution rights
granted to copyright holders in the case of digital media.
The opportunities the internet provides to the fields of the arts
and sciences are numerous. First, computers bring the process of
21

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5564.

22

Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).

23

See generally Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff
Economy. (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
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recording and editing media such as music and film into the home.
This facilitates authorship by making the creative process less expensive and more convenient, which lowers the barriers for amateurs
and professionals alike to engage in creative acts. For example, there
are on average 72 hours of video uploaded on Youtube every minute,
and much of it is amateur and recorded on relatively inexpensive
devices such as webcams.24 This easy accessibility enriches the creative output in society.
Another great advantage that digital files have over material
works is that they can be reproduced and distributed at virtually no
cost. This unlimited reproducibility has a remarkable effect: namely,
scarcity virtually ceases to be one of the economic factors governing these goods. Furthermore, as these reproduced files can be distributed across the world almost instantly from servers to clients
via the internet, many other costs associated with sharing ideas and
media—such as packaging, shipping, and storing—are reduced or
eliminated.
Unfortunately, current copyright law restricts public engagement in these activities.25 When the Copyright Act of 1976 grants
copyright holders the right to “to reproduce the copyrighted work . . .
[and] distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending,”26 it either outlaws many of the most useful functions
of digital technology entirely, or, if it does allow them, it adds unnecessary costs, as users must seek and/or pay for permission to do
reproduce or distribute a work, requiring time and money.27
Herein lies one of the “challenges” that digital technology has
presented to the law: more opportunities for infringement, also
known as “piracy.” The statistics on piracy are stunning.28 Not only
24

Statistics, Youtube, http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics.

25

Gorman, supra note 4 at 99-119.

26

17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2011).

27

Id. § 204.

28

See generally Hendrik Schulze & Klaus Mochalski, Internet Study
2008/2009, Ipoque (2009), http://www.ipoque.com/sites/default/files/mediafiles/documents/internet-study-2008-2009.pdf.
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is it easier than ever before to reproduce and distribute a work, it is
also extremely difficult to police such actions on a significant scale.29
Deterrence through increasing the likelihood of retribution is impractical on such a large scale (and raises concerns about privacy
rights),30 which has instead led courts to rely on severe, messagesending punishments that are arguably out of proportion with the
nature of the crime.31
Piracy may seem malicious, but it also appears to be here to stay.
Psychologically, piracy is simply more permissible than stealing in
the minds of many.32 In fact, those who declare piracy as equivalent
to stealing are at odds with the Supreme Court: in Dowling v United
States in 1985, the Court stated that piracy “does not easily equate
with theft, conversion, or fraud.”33 The Court affirms an attitude that
pervades digital culture by stating that piracy, while perhaps ethically questionable, does not share the same moral stigma as theft. In
fact, it demonstrates a sort of moral and psychological loophole in
public thinking—however hard the entertainment industry tries to
equate the two practices, more people are willing to download a CD

29

Dave Lee, A Glimpse at Piracy in the UK and Beyond, BBC News, (Sep.
16, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19599527.

30

ACTA Up, The Economist, Feb. 11, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21547235

31

See Capitol v. Thomas, 692 F.3d 899; (8th Cir. filed Sept. 11 2012). The
defendant Jammie Thomas Rasset was ordered to pay sums ranging from
$54,000 dollars to $1.92 million after appeals for the infringement of 24
songs.

32

Kanika Tandon Bhal & Nivedita D. Leekha, Exploring Cognitive Moral
Logics Using Grounded Theory: The Case of Software Piracy, 81 J.
of Bus. Ethics 635, 635-646; (2008) available at http://www.jstor.org/
stable/25482242.

33

Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 218 (1985).
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than actually steal it.34 For whatever reason, enough people choose to
pirate virtual media that any attempt at rigorous enforcement would
be impractical.
As neither internal morals nor external enforcement are sufficient to prevent it, a great deal of music ends up in consumer hands
without passing through a channel that will reimburse the copyright
holder. Thus, in practice, the system established in the Copyright Act
fails to ensure the result that the Constitution requires. In effect, the
strict provisions of the Act become something that amounts to legal
deadweight, which, while failing to secure its intended benefits for
artistic creators, still manages to promote costly litigation, preserve
an obsolete economic system, and condemn millions of otherwise
law-abiding Americans.
As long as current legal attitudes towards copyright prevail,
technology and the law will remain at odds in this regard. This tension was created by an attempt to apply old law to new media, while
simply ignoring the fact that these are not analogous in important
ways. The provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976 that deal with
reproduction and distribution are products of the time in which the
Act was drafted; this is manifested in the fact that their intent is
to protect objects. Current copyright law regarding distribution and
reproduction makes sense in the case of physical materials, because
materials, shipping, and transportation are costly. Copyright law
gives publishers an incentive to assume these costs by protecting
their rights to profit from that physical work. However, in the case of
digital media, just about anybody can become a “publisher,” because
the costs are minimal, requiring only a computer and an internet
connection.
The irony is that all the law must do to solve its digital “problem”
is in fact to embrace it. This could be accomplished by legalizing
34

See Julian Sanchez, How Copyright Industries Con Congress, Cato
Institute (Jan. 3, 2012, 2:07 PM) http://www.cato.org/blog/how-copyrightindustries-con-congress; Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, How Much Do
Music and Movie Piracy Really Hurt the U.S. Economy? Freakonomics
(Jan 12, 2012, 3:09 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2012/01/12/howmuch-do-music-and-movie-piracy-really-hurt-the-u-s-economy; ACTA
Up, supra note 29.
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private, personal reproduction and distribution (hereinafter referred
to as “sharing”). As digital media effectively eliminates the problem
of scarcity, the public is being presented with incredible opportunities. Theoretically, global culture and its accompanying art and
entertainment could be as broadly accessible as the internet itself!
The social implications are staggering—American culture need not
be available only in proportion to one’s means; once the fixed cost
of internet access is met, the marginal gains could be enormous.
Furthermore, copying and sharing promote the advancement of
the arts, which advancement has both a component of creation and
scale of use and access.35 Increasing the amount of legal sharing that
takes place would foster scholarship and creativity by broadening
the scope of the conversation, as it were. Both self-expression and
scholarship heavily involve an engagement with the work of others.
If more artists and creative minds were connected to each other, and
more people had more access to the discourse, creativity would likely increase.36

III. Ensuring Creativity: Economic Considerations
While the benefits of relaxing copyright law are apparent, they
are only half of the picture. Copyright law is a balance between the
interests of two specific parties, and we have yet to examine how
such a move would affect the people who are responsible for the benefits of the “Science and Useful Arts”: the creators themselves. It is
important that revisions to copyright law be made without regard to
the vested interests of particular business and consumer groups and
instead be assessed by its consequences for efficiency in markets for
creative works.37 That being said, no amount of public right expan35

See Litman, supra note 11, at 29, 30. To illustrate with the inverse, if
someone cannot access (directly or indirectly) a work, does it matter to
them whether or not that work exists in the first place?

36

Kirby Ferguson, Everything is a Remix. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.everythingisaremix.info.

37

See Nathan Musick, Copyright Issues in Digital Media (Juyne Linger et
al. eds., 2004), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps66530/0809-Copyright.pdf.
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sion would be worth the extinction of authors and the works that
they would have created. Before applying these proposed changes,
then, one must investigate their potential impact on authors. While
it is impossible to know exactly, broad trends give a good indication
of what this impact would be, and the results are somewhat surprising. Granted, it is difficult to determine whether or not there is an
“optimal” (i.e., economically efficient) amount of creative works, but
it appears that even without the right to restrict sharing, incentives
would remain sufficiently high to ensure great quantity, quality, and
variety in creative output. This is because there are many factors
besides sharing rights that provide incentive to create.
As long as art is costly to produce, basic economic theory asserts
that there must be compensation to give incentive to create. Fortunately, even without granting creators the rights to govern sharing,
the law can continue to provide incentive to create by protecting other
exclusive rights for copyright holders. If the law were revised to give
people freedom to exchange and share media privately, it could still
protect creators’ claims to authorship as well as their ability to control the commercial uses of their works. This is a comparatively easy
task which can yield huge gains for authors.38
The first commercial use that can mean great deals of money for
artists is associated with advertisement. Youtube,39 a media sensation, is a perfect example of how this might function. If an artist
releases their song or video on Youtube and chooses to monetize it
through advertising, the result can be lucrative. An article published
in Rolling Stone magazine reports that top artists may receive approximately $1 for every 1000 views through advertisements.40 Recently, an amateur “artist” made a video that included a song by
38

Jim Luke, Corporate Entitlements: Music Edition, EconProph Blog (May
30, 2011), http://econproph.com/2011/05/30/corporate-entitlements-music-edition/.

39

Lucas Hilderbrand, Youtube: Where Cultural Memory and Copyright
Converge, 61 Film Quarterly 48 (2007), available at http://www.jstor.
org/stable/10.1525/fq.2007.61.1.48.

40

Steve Knopper, The New Economics of the Music Industry, Rolling Stone
Mag. Oct. 25, 2011, at 3, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/music/
news/the-new-economics-of-the-music-industry-20111025.
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Chris Brown called “Forever.” When this article was published, this
amateur video had 70 million views. Instead of taking down the
video, Sony (the copyright holder for Brown’s song) took a cut of the
earnings, and Sony earned about $70,000 serendipitously, if Rolling
Stone estimates are correct.41 Thus, the incentive to create something
popular could still be great even without the profit from selling media like property because popular works are valuable to advertisers
who want to reach as many people as possible.
A different avenue of potential income is through commercial
licensing.42 For example, when a song is popular, companies want to
put it in commercials. A popular movie results in the sale of products
associated with its characters, setting, or story. As with advertising,
success gives incentive to piggyback, and the proposed relaxation
of regulation does not change the artist’s ability to control and profit
from such ventures.
Another possible means of artistic compensation is subscription:
if an artist only releases his or her media on a subscription-based
site, all those who access those works must pay some kind of entrance fee. Sites like Netflix offer access to television shows through
subscription.43 A variation of the subscription model is known as
“freemium,” which allows people to freely use basic versions of their
services with the option to pay a subscription fee for greater access.
This model is employed by media distribution companies like Spotify as well as companies that create software.44
These alternative models of revenue generation are not meant
to be mutually exclusive; rather, they function in tandem to provide
41

Id.

42

Online Software Piracy: Head in the Clouds, The Economist Blog
(July 25, 2012, 3:32 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/07/online-software-piracy.

43

Greg Bensinger, Netflix Shares Surge 35% on Profit, Wall St. J., Jan. 24,
2013, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788
7324039504578260182003808560.html.

44

See Katherine Heires, Why It Pays to Give Away the Store, Bus. 2.0, Oct.
1, 2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/2006/10/01/8387115/index.htm.
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incentives for an artist or publisher. Indeed, all of these approaches
have promising elements in common. They are internet-intuitive,
capitalizing on the vast network’s ability to connect people and
ideas on a vast scale. The openness of the model based on advertising would give less incentive to infringe, which would result in a
compensation ratio that is closer to 1:1. One of the major drawbacks
of the “property” system of copyright protection in the context of
digital media is that it encourages freeloading, which may result in a
low compensation ratio for the artist and produce an inefficient and
less-than-ideal outcome.
To adopt these systems as the primary means of compensation
for artists may have implications that initially feel uncomfortable:
will artists cease to make music available for regular sale in favor
of music made for licensing, subscription, and advertisement-driven
sites? Will the public be able to “own” media any longer, or will they
be tied to a view-by-view system? The answer to these questions
may be yes; however, not only is this outcome more fair than expecting creators to allow the public to freeload, it is also a more beneficial system in the long run. Discounting an idea solely because it is a
paradigm shift is short-sighted and ultimately detrimental.
On the other hand, allowing users to share digital media may not
necessarily prevent an artist from making his or her work available
to own and share. Publicity can create value, after all. When asked
about the effect that piracy had on his income, one artist stated the
following:
I sell a lot of tickets. I’ve sold 1.2 million albums, and the
stat [sic] is that there’s 8 million downloads of that as well illegally . . . Nine million people have my record, in England,
which is quite a nice feeling . . . I’m still selling albums, but
I’m selling tickets at the same time. My gig tickets are like
£18, and my albums £8, so...it’s all relative.45
In the case of music, a “viral” song could function less as an item to
be sold and more as a contagious form of advertisement that could
lead to profits.
45

Lee, supra note 28.
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Certainly, there are alternatives to pretending that digital media
can function only as tangible property to be bought and sold, and
these alternatives can provide incentive to create a work that will become popular and in high demand. This incentive is precisely what
the Constitution requires and prescribes.
Finally, the “progress of the useful arts and sciences” may not
rely quite as much upon rights-based incentives as one may think.
There has been much commentary on the phenomenon of Wikipedia, an open-source encyclopedia that runs entirely on the creative
and scholarly works of volunteers.46 These volunteers receive neither
compensation nor recognition, yet the site thrives with 24 million
free articles.47 The amount of creative contribution is astounding and
seems to belie economic principles. Another example of this economic paradox can be seen in the highly competitive fields of careers
in the arts. For example, BLS.gov reports that “many musicians and
singers find only part-time or intermittent work and have long periods of unemployment between jobs.”48 Despite this, “there should be
strong competition for jobs because of the large number of workers
who are interested in becoming musicians and singers.”49 While it is
true that some musicians, authors, filmmakers, etc., make great deals
of money, the chances of any one person being able to do so are very

46

Wikipedia:About, Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About
(last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (As of Jan. 14, Wikipedia reports 586,936,117
edits on the website, 18,250,367 registered users who can actively edit
pages. They are all doing this free of charge with no financial benefit to
themselves. Questions of reliability aside, this reflects a staggering of
creative work done for free).

47

Wikipedia, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.
php?title=Wikipedia (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).

48

Bureau of Lab. Stat., http://www.bls.gov/ooh/entertainment-and-sports/
musicians-and-singers.htm

49

See id.
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small. That lottery’s chance of success would also be present in the
alternative economic models described here.50
Any explanation as to why people choose to contribute to the
arts and sciences with little to no compensation would be merely
speculative and is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this behavior is a reality, and it suggests that whatever decrease in incentive
that might result from legal copyright change would not be overly
detrimental to creative output.

IV. Conclusion: The Big Picture
The Constitution provides that the law protect certain rights
for authors so that art, science, entertainment, and scholarship will
progress. The current codified interpretation in the Copyright Act
of 1976 is problematic and outdated in the sense that it erroneously
treats digital works the same as it treats works that are inherently
more tangible. This policy is easy to abuse and difficult to enforce.
The internet is at once largely responsible for these abuses and the
provider of an incredible opportunity because it can virtually free
us from scarcity in many cases. This freedom could lead to an incredible expansion of intellectual and creative progress: greater accessibility means that as a work’s benefit to society increases, the
intellectual/creative conversation becomes more widespread and
democratic, and media becomes a socially equalizing force. This
could be accomplished by expanding the existing definition “fair
use” to allow for private reproduction and distribution. The biggest
potential drawback of such a move is the decrease of incentive for
artists and authors to produce creative works; however, the internet
itself allows many other ways to monetize creative endeavor in the
absence of vending—not to mention the fact that there seem to be
50

Even if perhaps the odds become slightly slimmer or the “jackpot”
reduces somewhat without the right to sell digital files, it seems unlikely
that this will greatly affect people’s perception of the potential upside and
likely downside of pursuing a creative path. In other words, the difference
between “1 in a million” and “1 in 1.37 million” would probably have
a negligible effect on people’s perception of the opportunities of the industry, both situations being likely to be perceived as “very small.”
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other compelling factors besides monetary compensation that drive
people to create. Since this proposed change would most likely leave
plenty of incentive to innovate, it is Constitutional as well as economically and socially beneficial.
The actions of the general population support the idea that media
“sharing” is not as insidious as it is often portrayed. Otherwise lawabiding people have been known to engage in copyright infringement despite commercials, piracy warnings, and lectures attempting
to persuade them that sharing is as wrong as stealing and that it is destroying the art and entertainment industry. While this might make
the offending parties feel a bit guilty or vaguely nervous about being
caught, it appears that many people do not seem to find such arguments all that convincing, perhaps because they subconsciously realize that their actions may not be as detrimental as anti-sharers might
think. Sharers continue to participate in the revolutionary new sharing culture that has emerged with the internet. One might expect that
an age of unprecedented piracy would coincide with a sharp decline
in creative endeavors, but this does not appear to be the case. This
generation seems to match or even surpass any other in terms of the
quality, quantity, and variety of creative endeavor.51 The law would
do well to recognize this and should update policy accordingly.

51

See generally Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organization (Penguin Books, 2009).

